INTRODUCTION
When choosing the best restaurant for an evening dinner or picking an adequate birthday present for a friend, the available choice options are usually not directly on hand but have to be retrieved from memory. Typically, we ask ourselves what the good restaurants are that we know of, or what kind of gifts we made in the past. Thus, many value-based decisions rely on memory processes and bear the potential to be biased by forgetting relevant information. However, the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying memory-guided preferential choices are poorly understood. Here, we investigated the interplay of decision making and long-term memory processes in the brain using fMRI and a choice task that required participants to first encode and later recall the available choice options.
Converging work in psychology and neuroscience provides support for process models that describe decisions as emerging from sequential sampling of evidence (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren et al., 2008; Smith and Ratcliff, 2004) . In the case of preferential choices, the difference in subjective value between the available choice options is implemented as a decision variable (DV), which accumulates over time until a decision threshold is reached and a response is selected (Gluth et al., 2012 (Gluth et al., , 2013 Krajbich et al., 2010) . The DV is affected by random noise, implying that smaller value differences make choices less predictable. Moreover, as the noise is progressively cancelled out by sampling (Shadlen and Kiani, 2013) , these models can account for the increase of choice accuracy with decision time (Diederich, 2003; Forstmann et al., 2008; Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998) .
In principle, we predict that memory-guided preferential choices can be accounted for by the same computational mechanisms and thus profit from having more time to decide. The potential of forgetting information, however, should limit decision accuracy and might also introduce a bias toward remembered options. The first goal of this study was thus to identify the particular challenges of decisions from memory. Thereto, we compared the behavior of participants in an fMRI memory group (henceforth memory group) with the behavior of participants in a non-fMRI control group (henceforth control group) who performed the identical choice task with/without the necessity to recall the choice options. Second, we developed a process model of choice to unravel the cognitive mechanisms of memory-guided decision making as well as to inform the analysis of the fMRI data. With respect to these fMRI analyses, we first tested whether modeling choice behavior is sufficient to make predictions about memory-related activation in the brain. In other words: can we infer memory strength on the basis of memory-guided decision, analogous to the well-established subsequent memory effect (Kim, 2011; Paller and Wagner, 2002) ? Second, we were interested in the neural circuitry underlying preferential choices from memory and how this circuitry mediates a putative memory bias on decisions.
RESULTS

Behavioral Results
In the experimental study, n = 30 hungry participants were introduced to 48 different food snacks and indicated their willingness to pay money for each of the snacks in a BeckerDeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction (Becker et al., 1964) (Figure 1A) . Similar to previous studies (e.g., Krajbich et al., 2010; Polanía et al., 2014) , we used the individual BDM values as a measure of the snacks' subjective values and to define choice accuracy in the subsequent ''memory and decision'' task (see below) by assuming that a choice is ''correct'' if the option with the higher BDM value is selected. Afterward, participants underwent fMRI while conducting the ''memory and decision'' task ( Figure 1B ). The task comprised multiple runs and each run included four different phases: encoding, distraction, decisions, and cued recall. During encoding, participants learned to associate 6 different snacks with 6 different locations on the screen. We manipulated the ability to remember the snacks by presenting three of them only 13 and the other three 23. After working on a two-back distractor task for 30 s to ''overwrite'' their working memory, participants repeatedly In each run, participants first learned to associate snacks with locations. Half of the snacks were encoded 23. After a two-back working memory task, participants repeatedly decided between the snacks. Only locations were shown (for either 1 s or 5 s before the response could be made), and corresponding snacks had to be retrieved from memory. At the end, participants had to report the identity of each snack and how well they remembered it. fMRI data were collected during encoding phase, two-back task, and decision phase as indicated by the gray background.
chose between two snacks during the decision phase, knowing that one of their choices would be paid out at the end of the experiment. Critically, the snacks were not visible; instead, only locations were highlighted and participants had to recall the snacks' identities linked to these locations. To test a central prediction of sequential sampling models (SSMs), the improvement of decisions with time, highlighted locations were shown for either 1 or 5 s before the response had to be given. After the decision phase, the MR scanner was turned off and participants were asked to recall the snacks. A control group (n = 30) that did not undergo fMRI conducted the same task, but with snacks being visible during the decision phase.
With respect to behavior, we first investigated the cued recall performance of the memory group. Figure 2A shows that participants remembered more items shown 23 than shown only 13 (t (29) = 6.78, p < 0.001), suggesting that we successfully manipulated memory strength. Importantly, in contrast to previous research that investigated the impact of reward on long-term memory formation (Adcock et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2014; Wittmann et al., 2005) , we focused on the influence of memory on reward-based decision making. Therefore, we ensured that the value of an item did not affect participants' ability to remember it (see Experimental Procedures). Indeed, a linear regression analysis for each participant with recall performance as a dependent variable and BDM value as a predictor was not significant (t (29) = 1.40, p = 0.171). Likewise, a regression analysis with ''absolute'' BDM value (i.e., a snack's value difference from the individual mean BDM value) was not significant (t (29) = 1.76, p = 0.089). Consistently, when splitting the offered snacks into six categories of BDM values (from lowest to highest), the memory performance was comparable across all categories (all pairwise comparisons p > 0.1; ANOVA with factor BDM value category: F (5,25) = 0.43, p = 0.825) ( Figure 2B ).
Next, we examined the choice behavior during the decision phase. To test whether and how the manipulations of memory strength and decision time affected decision making, we analyzed choice accuracy in a 2 3 2 3 2 mixed ANOVA with encoding type (both snacks shown 13 versus 23) and decision time (1 s versus 5 s) as within-subject factors and group (memory versus control) as between-subjects factor ( Figure 2C ). We obtained significant main effects for the factors group (F (1,58) = 18.20, p < 0.001) and decision time (F (1,58) = 58.56, p < 0.001), indicating that the control group performed better than the memory group and that both groups were more accurate when having more time to decide. Furthermore, the interaction of group 3 encoding type was significant (F (1,58) = 9.11, p = 0.004), showing that only the memory group was more accurate (A and B) Cued recall performance in the memory group was higher for items encoded 23 and independent of the value of the recalled item. (C) Choice accuracy in the memory group was lower than in the control group; both groups benefited from longer decision time; only the memory group profited from encoding snacks 23. (D) The memory group preferred snacks shown 23 over snacks shown 13. (E) Choice accuracy in the memory group, depending on whether both, one, or none of the snacks were recalled. (F) Participants were more accurate if the snack with the higher value (''better'') was recalled compared to if the ''worse'' snack was recalled. (G) Probability of choosing the remembered snack (over the forgotten snack) depending on its z-transformed BDM value; black line, frequency of selecting the remembered snack; gray line, average fit of a logistic function (see Equation 1); participants' preferences were shifted toward remembered snacks. Error bars and dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. See also Figure S1 . when the snacks had been shown 23 (as compared to 13) during encoding (memory group: t (29) = 3.00, p = 0.006; control group: t (29) = 1.11, p = 0.276). Taken together, decisions become more accurate with more time to decide (in line with SSM predictions), but performance is limited by the capability to remember the relevant information.
A central goal of this study was to test whether memory biases choices. Thereto, we first looked at the third of decision trials, in which one snack was shown 23 and the other only 13. If participants are driven toward remembered snacks, they should show a preference for snacks shown 23 (since their memory for these snacks was better). Indeed, we found that the 23 snack was selected more often than the 13 snack (t (29) = 2.50, p = 0.018) ( Figure 2D ), even though the snacks' BDM values were carefully matched (see Experimental Procedures). In contrast, the control group did not show this effect (t (29) = 1.39, p = 0.174; but the interaction of group 3 encoding type did not reach significance), suggesting that the more frequent presentation of specific choice options did not lead to an increased preference by itself as one could predict based on the ''mere-exposure '' literature (Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc, 1980) . Next, we split decision trials (only for the memory group) according to whether both, one, or none of the snacks were correctly reported during cued recall ( Figure 2E ). Expectedly, participants performed at chance level when they forgot both snacks (paired t test against 50%: t (29) = 1.65, p = 0.110) and decided worse when they forgot one snack compared to when they remembered both (t (29) = 5.53, p < 0.001). We further examined those trials for which participants recalled only one of the two snacks by splitting them according to whether the remembered snack had the higher or lower BDM value (i.e., whether it was the better or worse of the two offered snacks) ( Figure 2F ). Consistent with a memory bias, participants selected the better snack more often, if it was remembered than if it was forgotten (t (29) = 4.93, p < 0.001). However, choice accuracy was still above chance level, when only the worse item was recalled (t (29) = 4.04, p < 0.001). Together, the results show that when one snack was forgotten, participants were biased toward choosing the remembered snack but did not select it in all instances. Instead, they seemed to compare the recalled snack to a reference value and rejected the snack, if its value was below this reference.
To substantiate this conclusion, we z-transformed the BDM values within each participant and tested how often the remembered snack was chosen depending on its (z-transformed) value ( Figure 2G ). The rationale of the z-transform is that it can conveniently illustrate a memory bias: participants should be indifferent between the remembered and the forgotten snack, if the remembered snack has an average value (i.e., z-transformed value = 0). For each participant, we estimated a logistic regression model of the type:
where y indicates whether the remembered snack was chosen (y = 1) or rejected (y = 0) and x represents the z-transformed BDM value of this snack. The crucial test for a memory bias on choice is whether the parameter b 0 , which shifts the logistic function to the left or right, is significantly different from 0.
Indeed, b 0 was significantly higher than 0 (0.60 ± 0.83; t (29) = 3.93, p < 0.001), consistent with a bias toward remembered snacks. The control group did not exhibit such a bias (Figure S1A ). These choice patterns are in line with the assumption that remembered options are compared to a reference value (which is lower than the mean value of all snacks), if the alternative option is forgotten. Note, however, that the analysis is based on a small number of trials. Furthermore, it relies on the cued recall performance that might not exactly reflect the memory state in the decision phase (the correlation between choice accuracy and cued recall accuracy was significant but moderate: r (29) = 0.36; p = 0.049). Thus, a more systematic approach is to model decisions themselves for deriving the parameters that underlie preferential choices from memory.
Developing and Testing a Choice Model
Participants showed a complex pattern of choice behavior depending on the available decision time and on their memory of the choice options. Choices were more accurate when they had more time to decide, but performance was constrained by the mnemonic demands of the task and thus improved by lowering these demands (i.e., for snacks encoded 23). Forgotten snacks were rejected more often, but not if the remembered alternative was very unattractive. Based on this pattern, we developed a computational process model of memory-guided preferential choice (Figures 3A and 3B) and estimated its parameters using Bayesian cognitive modeling ( Figure 3C and Table 1 ) (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2014 ) (see also Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details about model and parameter estimation). Essentially, the model predicts the probability with which one of the two options is chosen by a Wiener diffusion process with drift (Luce, 1986; Ratcliff, 1978) . This drift is governed by a DV that is related to (1) the BDM values of the two options, (2) the probability that the options are successfully remembered, and (3) the memory bias that comes into play when one option has been forgotten. Since participants are forced to decide after a predetermined amount of time, the choice probability depends on the expected position of the DV at the time point of the decision ( Figure 3A) . Importantly, the model predicts more accurate decisions with longer decision time.
Essentially, the model incorporates four free parameters to describe the various behavioral patterns: (1) s, the standard deviation of the DV that models the degree of randomness in the choice behavior; (2) a, the probability of remembering a snack that was encoded only 13; (3) b, the improvement of memory for snacks encoded 23; and (4) g, the memory bias that quantifies the degree to which a remembered snack is preferred over a forgotten snack (negative values indicate a bias toward remembered snacks). To fit the model to the data, we employed a hierarchical Bayesian modeling approach allowing us to assume that individual parameters are drawn from Gaussian group distributions. Besides general advantages of this method (e.g., with handling outliers), it enabled us to estimate the different parameters of the memory and the control group in a combined fashion: as participants of the control group did not have to recall the choice options from memory, we fixed all their parameters that were linked to the mnemonic nature of our task (a = 1, b = 0, g = 0). On the other hand, we assumed that the parameter s, which is linked to decision making in general, is drawn from a joint distribution coming from both groups (see also Supplemental Experimental Procedures for a comparison with Maximum Likelihood Estimation).
The estimation of the model requires defining prior distributions for the group parameters. A Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm then samples from these priors to empirically derive posterior distributions given the data and the model ( Figure 3C ; see also Figure S2 ). The critical test for our model is whether there is evidence that the posterior group means of the free parameters are different from values that would render these parameters irrelevant. For example, if the posterior group mean of the memory-related parameter a was 1, this would suggest that participants had remembered all snacks-thus rendering a itself irrelevant. Practically, the relevance of a parameter is given by the Bayes Factor (BF) between the complex model that contains a as a free parameter and the restricted model without the parameter a (i.e., a = 1), which can be approximated by the Savage-Dickey density ratio (i.e., the ratio of the prior and posterior distributions at a = 1) (Kass and Raftery, 1995; Lee and Wagenmakers, 2014) . As shown in Table 1 , the BFs for all parameters provide evidence for the more complex models, illustrating that the parameters captured relevant patterns in the choice behavior. The BFs range from 2.63 to N; BFs between 1 and 3 has been asserted to provide weak evidence, between 3 and 10 moderate, between 10 and 100 strong, and a BF beyond 100 decisive evidence (Jeffreys, 1961) . Thus, in most cases there is at least moderate evidence in favor of the proposed model. Moreover, the model is able to reproduce the choice accuracy rates for the different conditions and groups ( Figure S3 ). We also tested a more complex model that allows for decay or self-excitation of the DV (i.e., an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model) but did not find support for it ( Figure S4 ).
Behavioral Study with Free Responses
The developed SSM predicts the finding that choice accuracy increased with decision time. However, even though normative economic choice models do not take decision time into account, they could be adapted easily-for instance, by linking decision time to the error function of random utility models (cf. Loomes and Sugden, 1995) . Hence, we sought to provide further support for our SSM by an additional behavioral experiment with 17 new participants who completed the same task as the memory group but were free to respond at any time (up to a limit of 5 s) instead of being forced to wait a predetermined amount of time. The goals of this study were (1) to replicate the main behavioral findings of the fMRI memory group, (2) to replicate the model's ability to predict choice accuracies under different conditions, and (3) to show that the model captures the response time (RT) distributions of correct and incorrect decisions.
In line with the results from the fMRI memory group, participants of the new study were more accurate when both choice options were encoded 23 compared to 13 (t (16) = 2.56, p = 0.021) ( Figure 4A ). Furthermore, participants exhibited the same memory bias on choices; that is, they were more likely to prefer a remembered over a forgotten option (average b 0 [see Equation 1]: 0.67 ± 6.5; t (16) = 4.28, p < 0.001) ( Figure S1 ). Hence, the core behavioral findings of the fMRI experiment could be replicated.
With respect to modeling, we adapted the model to allow predicting RTs (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Specifically, SSM account for RT distributions by assuming that the sampling process stops as soon as a decision threshold is crossed (Smith and Ratcliff, 2004) . Hence, we introduced a decision threshold parameter d, which was allowed to vary between participants. With the exception of this threshold, we did not fit the parameters of the model to the data to provide a strong generalization test of the model (Busemeyer and Wang, 2000) . Instead we used the mean estimated parameters of the model from the memory group of Study 1 (i.e., s, a, b, g; see Table 1 ) to predict the data in Study 2. Only the (new) decision threshold was estimated using the hierarchical Bayesian approach (see Figure 4B and Table 1 ). Despite the restrictions of the model, we found that it predicted accuracy rates and RT distributions of correct and incorrect decisions with remarkable precision (Figures 4A and 4C ).
fMRI Results: Subsequent Memory When people encode information into long-term memory, activation of the hippocampus (HC) is higher when this information can be successfully retrieved later on compared to when it is lost (Kim, 2011; Paller and Wagner, 2002) . Usually, this subsequent memory (SM) effect is based on performance in a memory retrieval task following the encoding phase at some point. With respect to our paradigm, we tested whether memory-related activation during encoding can also be inferred from choice behavior (and our computational model). To this end, we used Bayes' rule to estimate the posterior probability, denoted as Posterior x , that a snack x was successfully remembered in the decision phase. Intuitively, Posterior x is high for chosen snacks of high value and for rejected snacks of low value (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures and Figure S5 for derivations and examples). Posterior x was implemented as a regressor in the fMRI analysis of the encoding phase. We found this variable to be significantly correlated with blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signals in the right anterior HC, while the left anterior HC activation did not reach significance ( Figure 5A and Table  S1 ). Activity in the right HC remained significant after controlling for the traditional SM effect (i.e., memory performance in the cued recall task). A comparison of model-based and traditional SM effects revealed that the model-based SM effect better accounted for the signal in right HC, and the traditional SM effect better explained left HC activation ( Figure 5B) , as qualified by a significant interaction effect of hemisphere 3 SM type on the signal averaged for anatomical regions of interests (ROIs) of left and right HC (F (1,29) = 4.56, p = 0.041). Note that the intra-individual correlation of model-based and traditional SM regressors was significant but rather low (r = 0.17, ± 0.09; t (29) = 10.04, p < 0.001), which is consistent with the moderate correlation of choice accuracy and cued recall accuracy (see above) and suggests that partially distinct memory mechanisms were required in the two different tasks.
fMRI Results: Value Representations during Encoding and Decisions A great deal of neuroimaging studies suggest that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the ventral striatum (VS) represent the subjective value of objects during decision making and other tasks (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014) . Consistently, the vmPFC and left VS signals were significantly correlated with the BDM value of the presented snack during encoding (the right VS signal did not survive small-volume correction) ( Figure 6A and Table S1 ).
With respect to decision making, the BOLD signal in vmPFC (and possibly VS as well) has been asserted to represent the value of the chosen option (Wunderlich et al., 2012) , chosen and unchosen options (Hare et al., 2011) , or the difference between chosen and unchosen options (Boorman et al., 2009 ). In our case, the question of which value is represented in vmPFC/VS is further complicated by the fact that an option x was only remembered with some probability Posterior x . Therefore, we set up a series of analyses to determine how exactly the values of chosen and unchosen options are represented, and whether these values should be corrected by Posterior x (for details, see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). First, we tested whether different combinations of the value of chosen options (V chosen ) and unchosen options (V unchosen ) revealed significant activation in vmPFC and VS using conventional General Linear Model (GLM) fMRI analyses. We found that only V chosen and the sum of V chosen and V unchosen (with and without modulation by Posterior x ) were correlated with the vmPFC/VS signals, but not their difference (or absolute difference). Next, we used a Bayesian model comparison approach for fMRI (Penny et al., 2005; Stephan et al., 2009 ; see also Gluth et al., 2014) to identify which of the remaining four regressors (V chosen , V chosen,modulated , V chosen + V unchosen , V chosen,modulated + V unchosen,modulated ) explained the vmPFC/VS signals best. There was moderate evidence for V chosen,modulated + V unchosen,modulated being the best predictor of the fMRI signal (the exceedance probabilities representing the relative probabilities that the data were generated by one of the regressors were 2.3%, 32.7%, 19.9%, and 45.1%, respectively).
These results suggest that both chosen and unchosen value signals (modulated by Posterior x ) are represented in vmPFC and/or VS. To corroborate this, we conducted a new GLM with separate regressors for V chosen,modulated and V unchosen,modulated . Indeed, we found significant activation in vmPFC for both V chosen,modulated and V unchosen,modulated ( Figure 6B and Table S1 ). V chosen,modulated but not V unchosen,modulated was also correlated with activation in the right VS. As can be seen in Figure 6B , we also obtained remarkably strong and bilateral HC signals linked to V chosen,modulated (but not V unchosen,modulated ). The effect remained significant even after controlling for memory-related variables (i.e., Posterior chosen , Posterior chosen + Posterior unchosen , cued recall performance), which by themselves were not related to HC activation in the decision phase. Taken together, these results provide strong evidence that not only vmPFC and VS but also HC represent the value of the chosen option in preferential choices from memory.
fMRI Results: Effective Connectivity between HC and vmPFC Given the distributed value representation in HC and vmPFC/VS during decision making, we asked how these brain regions are functionally coupled with each other to mediate memory-guided choices. Furthermore, we tested whether the memory bias on decisions also influences the HC-vmPFC coupling. To this end, we employed dynamic causal modeling (DCM; Friston et al., 2003) for inferring the most likely generative model of effective connectivity that underlies our data. We concentrated on the coupling between HC with vmPFC, because only vmPFC but not VS signals for subjective value (during encoding) and chosen value (during decisions) were overlapping and because vmPFC also represented unchosen value. Moreover, as neither HC nor vmPFC activations were correlated with the onset regressor of the decision phase (only with parametric modulations at that time), we introduced a third ROI in the visual cortex (right middle occipital gyrus) that exhibited strong activation during decisions ( Figure 7A and Table S1 ) as input region for the DCMs. Figure 7B depicts the three ROIs (visual cortex, HC, vmPFC) and their intrinsic connections together with the three driving Figure S5 and Table S1. inputs (decision onset, chosen value, unchosen value). Since we were interested in testing which coupling architecture best describes the memory-guided choice process, we specified 54 different DCMs for all possible combinations of intrinsic connections and driving inputs (Table S2 ) and used Bayesian model selection (BMS; Stephan et al., 2009 ) to obtain the most likely DCM given the data ( Figure 7B shows the most complex DCM including all connections and inputs that we considered). The model with the highest exceedance probability ( Figure S6 ) only included forward connections from the visual cortex to HC and from HC to vmPFC as well as the decision onset and value regressors as driving inputs for visual cortex and vmPFC (but not HC), respectively ( Figure 7C ).
Finally, we asked whether the connectivity model as a whole or specific couplings are influenced by the memory bias on choices. Therefore, we split trials based on whether-according to our model-the better memorized option was chosen or rejected (i.e., whether Posterior chosen > Posterior unchosen or vice versa). For both trial types, we again set up the 54 possible DCMs and compared them by means of BMS. In both cases, the best model was the same as for the comparison including all trials ( Figure S6 ), indicating that the general connectivity architecture was similar. However, only when participants chose the option with the higher posterior probability, the intrinsic coupling from HC to vmPFC was significantly positive, and the difference in HC-vmPFC coupling between the two trial types was significant (t (29) = 2.90, p = 0.007) ( Figure 7C ; Table S3 ).
fMRI Results: Psycho-Physiological Interaction The DCM analysis suggests HC and vmPFC to be coupled with each other only when participants chose the better remembered option. This finding leaves open which other brain regions are connected to vmPFC during memory-guided decisions in general and during trials in which the better remembered option was not chosen in particular. To this end, we applied two psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analyses (Friston et al., 1997) with the decision trial onsets of the two trial types from the DCM analysis as psychological variables and the vmPFC as seed region (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
Using a conjunction analysis, we tested which areas are connected to vmPFC during decision making in both trial types and found signals in a network comprising anterior medial PFC, posterior cingulate cortex, and angular gyrus ( Figure S7A ).
Notably, a strikingly similar activation pattern is reported in studies on recognition memory, especially when contrasting recollection against familiarity memory (Kim, 2010; Yonelinas et al., 2005) . Consistent with the DCM results, the PPI analysis did not reveal the HC to be generally coupled with vmPFC but only for Posterior chosen > Posterior unchosen trials ( Figure S7B ).
DISCUSSION
The present work investigates the impact of memory processes on value-based decisions when the choice options are not directly seen but have to be retrieved from memory. The behavioral results are consistent with choice accuracy and RT predictions of SSM but indicate that people are limited by memory constraints and biased toward options that they remember better. Our computational model helped quantifying this bias and allowed inferring memory-related brain activation during encoding (over and above the cued recall based SM effect). At the time of making memory-guided decisions, HC encodes the value of the chosen option together with VS and vmPFC, while only vmPFC further encodes the value of the unchosen option. Modeling effective connectivity during the choice process indicates the HC to be coupled with vmPFC, which in turn is more likely to generate choices on the basis of chosen and unchosen value signals (Hunt et al., 2012) . Finally, the strength of this HC-vmPFC coupling was higher when people chose the better remembered option and is therefore a direct neural marker of memory bias on preferential choice.
Perhaps surprisingly, we found HC signals during the choice process not to be correlated with memory-related variables. Instead, HC activation represented the value of the chosen option along with vmPFC and VS. It has been argued that the HC (together with VS and vmPFC) belongs to an automatic brain valuation system and is always activated in proportion to the subjective value of currently perceived objects-independent of any task demands (Lebreton et al., 2009 ). This view is not fully in line with our results, as it would predict value-dependent activation of HC during encoding as well (for which we did not find any evidence). Our findings rather indicate the representation of chosen value in HC to be specific to memory-guided decisions. The lack of any representation of the unchosen option's value together with the DCM and PPI results suggests that the HC does not simply play a ''neutral'' role of informing the vmPFC about the choice alternatives. Instead, it appears to bias the choice process toward better remembered items. Given that chosen value can also be a post-decision signal (but see Hunt et al., 2012) , an additional function of HC could be to encode the value of the chosen options for facilitating later comparisons. In this case, HC might receive chosen value signals from regions such as vmPFC or VS (though backward connections from vmPFC to HC were not supported by the DCM analysis).
In a recent fMRI study, Wimmer and Shohamy (2012) provided evidence for a critical role of HC in the biasing effect of associative memory on value-based choices. In this study, pictures of faces, scenes, and body parts were associated with neutral stimuli, and some of these neutral stimuli were then conditioned with monetary reward. Finally, the authors let participants choose between the pictures. Similar to our findings, they proposed an Table S1. increased connectivity between memory (HC) and reward/decision-making (caudate nucleus) areas in the brain to mediate a memory bias on choice. There are, however, essential differences between this study and ours: Wimmer and Shohamy investigated the impact of implicit memory association on choices, and people were unable to report the associations between pictures and conditioned stimuli. In contrast, we addressed the question of how explicit memories guide (and bias) value-based decisions. Moreover, the previous work focused on neural activity and connectivity during conditioning, while we looked at the coupling of HC and vmPFC when people were making decisions. Yet, the two studies provide emerging evidence that implicit and explicit memories bias preferential choices through elevated connectivity between HC and choice-related brain structures.
Why are people driven toward choice options that they remember better? One explanation is that people pay more attention to these options while making decisions. As soon as a past experience from a restaurant visit is recalled, for instance, one's attention is automatically drawn to that restaurant as a potential candidate. It has recently been established that options that receive more attention are more likely to be chosen (Krajbich et al., 2010) . A second but not mutually exclusive explanation is that (better) remembered options can be seen as safer options (''at least I know what I get'') and taking a forgotten alternative can be regarded as a risky decision. In other words, the parameter g of our cognitive model, which replaces the value of a forgotten option and is well below average value, resembles the certainty equivalent in risky choice: only if the certain (i.e., remembered) option is below this value, people take the risk Tables S1-S3. of selecting the unknown alternative (because they have sufficient certainty that this alternative is probably better). Future work could investigate whether risk-sensitive brain regions, such as the anterior insula (Mohr et al., 2010) are also involved in memory-guided decisions, and whether more risk-averse people are biased more strongly by their memories. A third explanation would be that our participants had the (wrong) impression that they remembered good options more often than bad options. If participants believed that forgotten options are usually worse than remembered ones, it would be rational for them to set the reference value g below average.
The interplay of memory and decision making have been investigated in two recent studies with fMRI (Kumaran et al., 2009 ) and magnetoencephalography (MEG; Guitart-Masip et al., 2013) , respectively. Kumaran and colleagues examined how the acquisition of conceptual knowledge (e.g., associations between shapes and locations) drives decision making and found that the HC-vmPFC circuit is essential to successfully learn and use such complex associations. Similarly, GuitartMasip and colleagues used a nonspatial, contextual reinforcement learning task to target the synchronization of MEG signals in medial temporal lobe (MTL) and PFC. Consistent with our results, these studies emphasize the central role of HC and vmPFC (and their coupling) in guiding choices from memory. Yet, our results deviate from this previous work in at least two important ways. First, we found that during decision making HC does not represent memory strength but the value of the chosen option. In contrast, Guitart-Masip and colleagues report that MTL theta power (4-8 Hz) and its synchronization with PFC theta were independent of reward and expected value. Second, neither of the two studies identified a memory-dependent choice bias and associated it with the coupling between HC and vmPFC.
Our Bayesian modeling approach enabled us to infer for each snack the posterior probability that it was successfully recalled during decision making (Posterior x ). The validity of this technique is corroborated by our finding that Posterior x was indeed associated with HC activation during encoding, a choice-model-based variant of the SM effect. Together with the rather moderate correlation of choice and cued recall performance, the apparent lateralization of SM effects (left = traditional, right = modelbased) suggests different mnemonic demands of the two task: being accurate in the choice task does not necessarily require recalling the identity of the snacks (as in cued recall) but only associating certain positions on the screen with higher and lower values (''I don't remember what snack it was, but it was a good one''). Notably, patients with right temporal lobectomy are specifically impaired in the successful retrieval of locations (Smith and Milner, 1981; Stepankova et al., 2004) . On a methodological level, our approach offers a principled way to capture trial-bytrial variability in neuroimaging signals with Bayesian optimal efficiency. Also, our newly developed paradigm could be further employed to investigate the specific role of memory in applied research areas such as dietary choice.
In conclusion, we have shown that a sequential sampling framework for preferential choices can be extended to memory-guided preferential decisions. This approach allows explaining how memory constraints can lead to specific memory effects on decision making. The effective connectivity from HC to vmPFC plays a central role in preferential choices from memory: it underlies the choice process in general and at the same time it mediates the tendency to select better memorized options.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES Participants
A total of 84 participants took part in the studies (34 in the fMRI memory group, 32 in the control group, 18 in Study 2 described in detail in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Two participants of the memory group and two participants of the control group were excluded because they responded either too early or too late in more than 25% of the decision trials. In addition, fMRI data of two participants of the memory group could not be analyzed due to problems with MR scanning (triggering, artifacts). Thus, the final sample of Study 1 comprised 30 participants in each group (memory group: mean age = 26.1 years, ± 3.9, 18-37 years; 18 females; control group: mean age = 25.0 years, ± 4.1, 18-35 years; 19 females). The study was approved by a local ethics committee (Ä rztekammer Hamburg) and all participants gave written informed consent. Participants were reimbursed for participation (10 Euro per hour) and could earn additional money and/or snacks based on the results of the BDM auction and the main task (see below). Participants of the control group and of Study 2 did not undergo fMRI.
Experimental Design
Participants were asked not to eat for 3 hr before coming to the study (they rated their level of hunger at the beginning of the study on a scale from 1 = ''not hungry at all'' to 7 = ''very hungry'' with 4.23 on average). Upon arrival, they were first shown all 48 snacks that were well-known products available in German supermarkets. The snacks were grouped into six categories (chips, chocolates, wine gums, salty snacks, chocolate bars, other snacks) of eight items each. To facilitate communication during scanning, participants then viewed one snack after the other on a computer screen and learned its associated name (they were supposed to say these names during cued recall).
Afterward, participants were introduced to the BDM auction: they could bet 0 to 3 Euro on each snack using a continuous visual analog scale (VAS); at the end of scanning, one of the BDM trials was selected randomly; also, a random amount between 0 and 3 Euro was drawn; they received this amount, if it was higher than their bid for the selected snack; otherwise, they received the snack. The BDM auction was conducted twice (in differently randomized order). In the first run, the green bar of the VAS always started at 1.5 Euros. For the second run, it started at the corresponding bid from the first run, thus allowing participants to reconsider their bets.
The choice sets of the main task depended on the results of the (second) BDM auction. In pilot studies, we observed that participants had particularly good memory for snacks with top BDM values. Therefore, we excluded the best 6 snacks for the main task, since the focus of this study was the influence of memory on choice (and not the influence of value on memory). From the remaining 42 snacks, we created 24 sets of 6 snacks each for the 24 runs of the main task. Each 6-item set consisted of snacks from at least 3 categories (so that decisions were always made between snacks from different categories). Snacks were split into 3 value levels (low, medium, and high) and each set contained 2 snacks from each level (so that values and choice difficulty was similar across sets). Trials with snacks of equal BDM value were not included. During the assignment of snacks to conditions (encoding 13 or 23 ; decision time 1 s or 5 s), we ensured that choice difficulty was similar across conditions. Furthermore, we minimized the number of repetitions of snacks across runs (especially for consecutive runs) to avoid intrusions.
Following the BDM auction, participants conducted the main task while lying in the MR scanner. Each of the 24 runs started with the encoding phase, in which participants learned the association of 6 different snacks to 6 different screen locations. Whereas snacks varied from run to run, locations stayed the same. Each trial started with the arrangement of locations (white squares) for a variable time period of 2-6 s. One location was then highlighted (red square) for 1 s. Afterward, the snack was displayed at this square for 2 s. To ensure that participants paid attention, they had to indicate whether the snack was salty or sweet (by pressing buttons with the left index finger for ''salty'' or with the right index finger for ''sweet'' on two MR button-boxes). 3 of the 6 snacks were shown 23 during encoding. These repeated encoding trials were always the last 3 trials of each encoding phase (so that participants could not anticipate which snacks would be shown only 13). The encoding phase was followed by a two-back working memory task with 30 digits from 0 to 9. Here, participants had to press another button of the right box with their middle finger if the current digit matched the digit presented two steps before. Digits were presented for 900 ms, followed by a 100 ms interval between digits. Participants were told that incorrect decisions in the ''salty-sweet'' and the twoback tasks would lower their chances to receive a snack after scanning (we reduced the probability of receiving a snack by 3/10, if participants were less than 70% accurate in the two-back task, and by 1/216 for every miss in the ''salty-sweet'' task). The decision phase succeeded the two-back task, also starting with a display of the 6 locations for 2-6 s. 2 out of 6 locations were then highlighted for either 1 s or 5 s by filling the squares white (in contrast, the control group saw the 2 snacks themselves). Participants were not allowed to respond during this time window but waited until the accentuation disappeared again; they had then 700 ms to make their choice between the two snacks. A choice made too early or too late decreased the chances of receiving a snack at the end of the experiment (if the randomly picked decision trial was a miss, no snack was received). To decide between snacks, participants used their left and right index fingers (locations were arranged so that one option was always more on the left). In each run, participants made 9 decisions (216 decisions in total), and each snack was offered 3 times. In pilot studies, we observed that choice accuracy slightly increased over these 9 trials, possibly because participants had already remembered a snack at an earlier presentation (e.g., if a snack is presented the third time, it might have been successfully retrieved at the first and/or second time and now it is easier to retrieve it again). This improvement was also observed in the fMRI memory group (choice accuracy for snacks shown the first time: 69.6% ± 9.6%: the second time: 71.8% ± 10.5%; the third time: 75.6% ± 8.8%; F (2,58) = 14.11, p < 0.001). The problem could have been avoided by showing each snack only once but this would have reduced the number of decision trials to 72 and would have precluded iterating the estimation of Posterior x (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Instead, we ensured that two simultaneously offered snacks always had the same number of repetitions (in other words, they were both shown 0, 1, or 2 times before) to match their chances of being retrieved. The number of decisions between snacks that were both shown 23 during encoding, both shown 13, or one shown 23 and the other 13 was equal. At the end of each run, MR scanning was paused and participants had to recall all 6 snacks: after the six locations were displayed for 2 s, one location was selected (in randomized order) and highlighted, and the participant had to vocalize the associated snack to the experimenter via the MR micro. In addition, participants indicated how well they remembered each snack using a VAS from ''very poor'' to ''very good.'' Participants of the control group did not vocalize the snacks but prompted 3-letter abbreviations that they had learned at the beginning of the study.
Participants received their reward (money and/or snacks) when exiting the MR scanner. Before leaving the study, they rated each snack with respect to its familiarity and distinctiveness and filled out a questionnaire assessing their preferences for different snack categories, potential strategies they used to recall the snacks, and their body weight and height. Stimulus presentation and creation of choice sets were realized using MATLAB and its toolbox Cogent 2000.
Cognitive Modeling
Details are provided in Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
fMRI Data Acquisition and Pre-Processing Details are provided in Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
Statistical Analysis of fMRI Data
Conventional statistical analysis of fMRI data was based on the GLM approach as implemented in SPM8. Since the MR scanner was paused at every cued recall phase, the dataset of each participant was divided into 24 time series. We collapsed these series to a single run per participant, as each run contained only a few encoding and decision trials. Individual design matrices included 12 onset vectors: two for the presentation of snacks shown 13 or 23 during encoding, two for left or right button presses during encoding, one for the duration of the two-back task, one for button presses during the two-back task, two for the presentation of choice options for 1 s or 5 s during decision making, two for left or right button presses during decision making, and two nuisance vectors for misses in encoding and decision trials, respectively (note that we had to declare the last trial of every decision phase as a miss, because MR scanning was paused immediately after, causing severe misspecification of the hemodynamic response of this last trial). The design matrix also included 24 session constants. Onset vectors were accompanied by parametric modulators (PMs) that modeled the predicted change of the hemodynamic response as a function of a variable of interest at the respective time point: all GLMs included the snack's BDM values and Posterior x as PMs for the encoding onsets. For the decision onsets, different implementations of chosen and unchosen value were used as PMs in multiple GLMs to test which value signals represent activation in vmPFC and VS best (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). To test for the traditional SM effect during encoding, we set up a new GLM to also include the cued recall memory performance (correct = 1, incorrect = 0) for the encoding onsets (the stepwise orthogonalization of PMs was deactivated to remove any shared variance). To test for effects of memory-related variables during decision making, we ran several GLMs that included Posterior chosen , Posterior chosen + Posterior unchosen , or the cued recall memory performance (number of remembered snacks = 0, 1, or 2) as additional PM for the decision onsets. During estimation of GLMs, a high-pass filter (at 0.005 Hz) and correction for temporal autocorrelation were applied to the data (a custom-built algorithm was used to adjust filter and autocorrelation to the fact that the 24 separate time series were collapsed to a single run). Contrast images were created for all onset vectors and PMs.
At the group level, we used the flexible factorial design as implemented in SPM8 to test for effects of associated PMs (e.g., the contrast images of Posterior x during presentation of snacks shown 13 and 23 were taken together in a single group-level analysis). The statistical threshold for the imaging results was set to p < 0.05, family-wise error rate (FWE) corrected for small volume (SVC). For value-based brain regions, SVC was based on spheres of 10 mm radius centered at peak voxels from previous studies (vmPFC: x = -3, y = 42, z = -6; Chib et al., 2009; VS: ± 14, 10, -10; O'Doherty et al., 2004) . For the HC and visual cortex, SVC was based on anatomical masks (left and right HC; left and right calcarine sulcus plus left and right inferior, middle, and superior occipital gyrus) of the AAL brain atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Regions beyond those for which we had a priori hypotheses were reported if they survived a threshold of p < 0.05, FWE corrected for whole brain. Activations are depicted on an overlay of the mean structural T1 image from all participants. Average beta estimates for HC ( Figure 5B ) were extracted and converted into BOLD % signal change using the SPM toolbox rfxplot (Glä scher, 2009).
Connectivity Analyses
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